This study focused on persons 65 years of age and over who were dually entitled to Medicare and Medicaid in 1978 
Introduction
The 1965 amendments to the Social Security Act created two distinct health insurance programs: Medicare for the aged and Medicaid for the poor. Recently, a number of changes have been suggested for these programs stemming from a need to contain the ever-rising expenditures. For Medicaid, proposals range from restricting program entitlement and benefits, altering reimbursement policies, and limiting freedom of choice of providers, to the most far-reaching of all-the federalization of Medicaid. For Medicare, proposals range from changes in program payment mechanisms and beneficiary cost-sharing to a fundamentally different financing system based on vouchers for Medicare beneficiaries.
Although Medicare and Medicaid are distinct programs, in 1980, an estimated 3.6 million aged persons were entitled to both. Consequently, any changes in one of the programs is likely to impact on the other. If benefits or eligibility are curtailed under Medicaid, persons entitled also to Medicare may substitute covered Medicare services for services that would otherwise have been covered by Medicaid. Similarly, changes in Medicare, for example increased costsharing, will shift the costs to Medicaid for the dual entitlees. Thus, knowledge about the characteristics of the population covered simultaneously by both programs, and their patterns of use, can be helpful in predicting the impact of any proposed changes to these programs.
This paper provides a description of the aged population entitled to both programs and analyzes their use of Medicare services. Aged persons in this study have qualified for Medicaid because they receive or are eligible for cash payments under a public assistance program, or are considered to be medically needy. Earlier studies have shown that the dually entitled population uses a higher than average proportion of Medicare services. A study published in 1973 focused on the use of physicians' services in 1969 (Piro, 1973) . It showed that the aged population covered by both Medicare and Medicaid had higher proportions of persons in the older age groups; that there were larger proportions of women and persons of races other than white; and that reimbursements per enrollee were higher for the dually entitled. Another study by Peel and Scharff (1973) , based on 1969 data from the Current Medicare Survey, showed that persons entitled to both Medicare and Medicaid had a higher number of services per user and a higher level of charges per user for ambulatory services than did other Medicare enrollees.
This study updates the earlier findings by presenting information for 1978 and analyzes a number of other important utilization variables including hospitalization and diagnostic case-mix. It also provides an estimate of total per capita expenditures made by these two public financing programs. In addition, the study analyzes mortality rates in order to determine whether or not the health status of the aged poor (that is, aged persons who are dually entitled and who receive cash assistance) differs from that of the aged Medicare-only population.
Before presenting the findings of this study, it is necessary to discuss briefly the structures of Medicare and Medicaid. Medicare is a Federal program. Acute care in hospitals and related post-hospital services provided by skilled nursing facilities and home health agencies are covered under Part A, the hospital insurance (HI) program. Physicians' and other related services are covered under Part B, the supplementary medical insurance (SMI) program. In addition, Part B also covers outpatient and home health services.
Of the total population 65 years and over in the nation, 95-98 percent are eligible for Medicare coverage. Currently, the major exceptions are certain aliens and Federal civil service employees and annuitants.
1 Effective in July 1973, Medicare coverage was extended to disabled persons under 65 years of age receiving cash benefits under the social security law for at least 24 consecutive months and persons under 65 years who have end-stage renal disease.
Medicaid is a State-Federal program that varies from State to State. Each Medicaid program is required to provide several basic services including inpatient hospital care, outpatient hospital care and rural health clinic services; other laboratory and X-ray services, skilled nursing facility care, and physicians' services. States may include additional services such as prescribed drugs, eyeglasses, and dental services.
State Medicaid programs must cover all groups or categories of people who are eligible to receive cash payments under one of the existing welfare programs established under the Social Security Act; that is, Title IV-A, the program of Aid to Families with Dependent Children, or Title XVI, the Supplemental Security Income program for the aged, blind, and disabled. In addition, States can elect to extend Medicaid coverage to the "medically needy"-those whose income resources are within limits set under the Medicaid State plan, or those who "spend down" their income because of large medical bills. Some States also provide Medicaid coverage to certain special groups not included in any of the Federal categories, that is, not entitled to Federal matching funds. Under the Medicare law, States may buy coverage in the SMI program for persons eligible for cash assistance or for medical assistance. For persons enrolled in both Medicare and Medicaid, Medicare makes the primary payment for Medicare-covered services. 
Methods

Sources of the Data
The analysis of services presented in this study is limited to services covered under the Medicare program. These utilization data come from the Medicare Statistical System, which is a by-product of the Medicare administrative record-keeping system. The study also uses information on the number of Medicaid recipients, which comes from the Medicaid annual reporting system. Because Medicaid data reported to the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) annually are available only on an aggregated basis, we could not link utilization data from both programs. 2 Most of the utilization data were drawn from the Continuous Medicare History Sample (CMHS), a subfile of the Medicare Statistical System. This sub-file was begun with 1974 data and was designed to provide a longitudinal data base for studying Medicare program use with a 5-percent sample of enrollees. Selected data from enrollment and utilization files have been combined into one record for each sample person. The CMHS is a 5-percent probability sample of all Medicare enrollees based on Medicare claim number. In periodic updates of the CMHS, new information on the use of Medicare benefits, derived from claims for payments, is appended to the sample enrollees' records. Because these data are based on a sample of enrollees, there are sampling errors associated with the estimates in this paper. A discussion of sampling error and tables of standard errors are given in the Technical Note.
Limitations of the Data
A limitation of this study involves identifying the population enrolled both in Medicare and in a State Medicaid program (often called the "crossover" population). In the Medicare Statistical System (MSS) there is no direct indicator that the Medicare enrollee is also enrolled in a State Medicaid program. However, there is a code used in the MSS known as the "buy-in indicator" which was used in this study to identify most of the crossover population.
As noted earlier, States may buy coverage in the supplementary medical insurance (SMI) program for persons who are eligible for cash assistance or for medical assistance. To do so, States pay the monthly SMI premiums for these individuals. In 1978, the annual premium amounted to $95.40 for each enrollee. Two followup studies are being planned for analyzing the use of all health care services by persons covered simultaneously under Medicare and Medicaid. One study will use data collected in the National Medical Care Utilization and Expenditures Survey (NMCUES); the other study will use person-level data from the Medicaid Management Information System (MMIS).
When persons are eligible under both programs, Medicare makes the primary payment for the Medicare service, and the State Medicaid obligation is limited to the deductible and coinsurance amounts.
States also have the option of deciding whether to buy coverage for all of their Medicare-eligible persons or only some of them. In 1978, 45 State Medicaid programs and the District of Columbia had buy-in agreements with the Federal government for some or all of their eligible population. Of those States with buy-in agreements in 1978, 21 bought coverage for cash assistance recipients only; the other 25 States bought coverage for both their cash and non-cash recipients.
Alaska entered into a buy-in agreement effective October 1982. Louisiana, Oregon, and Wyoming still do not have buy-in agreements for any of their Medicaid enrollees. Although Arizona has no Medicaid program, the State buys in to Medicare-Part B for its supplemental security income (SSI) population. 3 In 1982, Michigan and Wisconsin broadened their agreements to cover the medically needy. Medicare enrollees who are covered for SMI services through State buy-in agreements are referred to in this report as the "buyin population" or simply the "buy-ins."
The study population was confined to persons covered by both parts A and B of Medicare; that is, persons covered by only one part of Medicare were excluded. An estimated 96 percent of the buy-ins had coverage under both parts of Medicare.
Standardization of Rates
The age distribution of the buy-in population included in the study was very different from the comparison group. Thus, comparisons of the overall rates between the two groups could be misleading. To correct the crude rates for differences due to age composition, rates were standardized by the direct method, using the age composition of the total study population as the standard. The standardized rates are shown in the utilization, diagnosis, and mortality tables. 3 Title XVI of the Social Security Act provides cash assistance for the aged, blind, and disabled who have little or no income or resources.
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During 1978, there were 24.7 million aged persons in the U.S. enrolled in the SMI program (Table 1) . Of these, 2.8 million persons or 11.4 percent were enrolled sometime during that year through State buy-in agreements. That percentage differed greatly among States. Several southern States and California had percentages of buy-ins that were nearly double or greater than the national average: South Carolina (22.9), Georgia (24.2), Alabama (27.9), Mississippi (31.2), Arkansas (24.3), and California (22.3) . In contrast, the percentage of buy-ins was relatively low in other States: Connecticut (2.4), New Hampshire (2.5), Illinois (3.9), Minnesota (3.5) , and Nebraska (3.2) . These figures reflect differences by State in the proportions of the aged in the States' Medicaid programs as well as whether or not the State bought Medicare coverage for all eligible persons. SMI enrollment. The comparable percentages by State ranged from 29.5 percent in Mississippi to 5.7 percent in Wyoming. Medicaid recipients as a percent of the SMI enrollment represent a better estimate of Medicare-Medicaid crossovers than does the percent of the aged identified by the buy-in indicator.
Demographic Characteristics
As noted earlier, the study population included only persons with both HI and SMI coverage. Table 2 shows the demographic characteristics of the study population. Of the 23.0 million Medicare beneficiaries enrolled under both HI and SMI, 2.4 million persons were identified as having dual entitlement to Medicare and Medicaid (using the buy-in indicator for the determination). The distribution of the study population by age shows that the buy-in group was much older, with 17.3 percent 80-84 years old and another 18.3 percent 85 years and over, in contrast, in the group without buy-in status, 11.9 percent were 80-84 years of age and 7.9 percent were 85 years and over.
In the group with buy-in status, 28.8 percent were men and 71.2 percent were women. Thus, more than 7 of 10 in the buy-in population were women. For the group without buy-in, the percentages were 41.3 men and 58.7 percent women.
There were considerable differences by race. A much greater proportion of persons of races other than white was found among the buy-ins than in the comparison group. About three-fourths or 73.8 percent of the buy-ins were white and one-fourth or 24.3 percent were persons of other races. Among those without buy-in status, 91.0 percent were white, and only 6.2 percent were persons of races other than white. Table 3 shows that 10 percent of the persons in the study population were buy-ins. For all races combined, the percentages of buy-ins were higher for older age groups, ranging from 6 percent for the age group 65-69 years to 21 percent for persons 85 years and over. Of the total white enrollees, 9 percent were buy-ins, in comparison to 31 percent of persons of other races who were buy-ins. Further, among persons of races other than white there were very high proportions of buy-ins in the three oldest age groups. As shown, among persons of races other than white, 37 percent of all persons age 75-79 years were buyins; in the age group 80-84, the figure was 41 percent; and in the age group 85 and over, 51 percent were buy-ins. The corresponding percentages for white persons were only 10, 13, and 19 respectively. 
Utilization
The proportion of persons who used Medicare benefits was substantially greater for the buy-in population than for those without buy-in under both HI and SMI, and for each type of service (Tables 4, 5, and 6) .
Overall 230 persons per 1,000 enrollees used HI benefits ( Table 4 ). The rate for the buy-ins was 320 persons served per 1,000 or 1.5 times the rate of 220 per 1,000 for those without buy-in. When these rates were standardized to correct for differences in the age composition, the ratio of the rates of buy-ins to those without buy-in dropped to 1.4. In the age group 65-69 years, the number of persons served per 1,000 was 60 percent higher for the buy-ins than those without buy-in. The difference between the two groups diminished dramatically in the oldest age group with the rate of persons served per 1,000 only 20 percent greater for buy-ins age 85 years and over.
Under the SMI program, differences in persons served per 1,000 enrollees were not as great between the buy-ins and those without buy-in. Overall, under the SMI program, there were 595 persons served per 1,000 enrollees (Table 5 ). The rate of 756 per 1,000 for the buy-ins was 1.3 times the rate of 577 per 1,000 for non-buy-ins. The standardized rates also resulted in a ratio of 1.3.
The proportions of persons served in the buy-in group were greater for each type of service than for those in the non-buy-in status, whether measured by the actual or standardized rates (Table 6 ). Using the standardized rates, the greatest ratios between the two groups were in the use of home health agency services -SMI (2.0), home health agency services -HI (1.7), and other medical services (1.7). It is interesting to note that standardizing for age had its greatest effect on the rate of use of skilled nursing facilities, changing the ratio of buy-ins to non-buy-ins from 2.3 to 1.6.
The next series of tables show average reimbursements on a per user basis and on a per enrollee basis. Average reimbursements per user reflects the intensity of use of services by those who actually use program services. Average reimbursement per enrollee reflects the proportion of users as well as the average amount reimbursed per user of services.
Data on average reimbursements per user under HI and SMI by age, sex, and race are shown in Tables 7  and 8 . As the data indicate, differences in per user rates were not very great. Under HI the average reimbursement per user for buy-ins was $2,861 compared to $2,560 for those without buy-in, resulting in a ratio of 1.1. The standardized rates also produced a ratio of 1.1.
As noted in other measures of use, the ratio of reimbursements per user of buy-ins to those without buy-in under HI was highest (1.2) for the youngest age group, 65-69 years; for the oldest age group, 85 years and over, the reimbursement rates for buy-ins were about the same as for the comparison group. Under SMI, reimbursements per user were $488 for buy-ins and $411 for those without buy-in-a ratio of 1.2. Standardizing the rates resulted in only slight changes, maintaining the 1.2 ratio. Thus, the intensity of use of Medicare dollars was not substantially different for the actual users of services among the buyins compared to the non-buy-ins. Reimbursement amounts per user were developed for each State (but not presented here) to determine the ratios for the buy-ins to the non-buy-ins. For nearly every State the ratio was close to 1.0 for HI and SMI. However, in a few States the intensity of use of services by the buy-in group was considerably greater than the use by the non-buy-ins. In those States, the average reimbursement per user in the buy-in group was at least 40 percent higher than that for the nonbuy-ins, as shown: Because the proportion of users was so much greater, the reimbursement on a per enrollee basis was much higher for the buy-ins than for non-buy-ins. For all age groups combined, reimbursements under HI were 60 percent higher for the buy-ins than for those without buy-in (Table 9 ). The standardized rates resulted in a difference of 50 percent. The difference was greatest for the youngest age group, 65-69 years, where the average reimbursement was nearly twice as high for the buy-ins as for non-buy-ins. The disparity in reimbursement per enrollee decreases for older age groups: for persons 85 years and over, the reimbursement per enrollee for the buy-ins was only 20 percent higher than for non-buy-ins.
The ratios of reimbursement per enrollee under SMI were similar to those observed under HI. Overall, the standardized rates produced a ratio of 1.5; that is, reimbursements per enrollee were 50 percent higher for the buy-ins (Table 10) . By age, the pattern was similar to that noted under HI, that is, the disparity was greatest for the youngest age group and was considerably less for older age groups. Table 11 shows average reimbursement per enrollee by State. As shown, there was a wide range in average reimbursement per enrollee under both parts of Medicare. Under HI, several States showed average reimbursement per enrollee for buy-ins that were two times (or more) the rate for non-buy-ins Vermont (2.4), Connecticut (2.2), New Jersey (2.3), Illinois (2.1), North Carolina (2.1), Colorado (2.0), Utah (2.3), Nevada (2.9), Washington (2.1), and Hawaii (2.4). Under SMI, there were two States with average reimbursements per enrollee twice as high for buy-ins as for those without buy-in-Utah and Hawaii.
The relatively large disparities found in the HI and SMI programs (between the buy-ins and the non-buyins) in the proportion of users indicates that the probability of illness and use of services is far greater among the buy-ins. On the other hand, the relatively small differences generally found in the average reimbursement per user suggests that-once sick-the intensity of use of program dollars does not differ greatly between the two groups. Thus, the large differences in average reimbursement per enrollee for the two groups primarily reflects the large differences in the proportion of users.
These findings parallel those nearly always observed in the Medicare program regarding younger and older beneficiaries. Consistently, the proportion of users in the older age groups has been found to be far greater than the proportion of users in the younger age groups. Yet, the average reimbursement per user has been found to be similar for every age group, resulting, nonetheless, in large differences in average reimbursements per enrollee by age groups. 
Short-Stay Hospital Discharges by Diagnosis
For the two population groups, the rate of shortstay hospital discharges per 1,000 enrollees varied substantially for the major diagnostic groups and the 29 most common diagnoses. For each of the 15 diagnostic groups, buys-ins had higher discharge rates than non-buy-ins with ratios ranging from 1.1 to 2.4. The diagnostic group consisting of "Neoplasms" had the lowest ratio-1.1, and all of the leading diagnoses in that group had relatively low ratios. The group "Diseases of the Nervous System and Sense Organs" also had a low ratio-1.2, and the leading diagnosis in that group, "Cataract," had a low ratio of 1.1 (Table  12) . Evidently, for these conditions the poor and nonpoor have a similar rate of hospitalization.
In contrast, the hospitalization experience for certain conditions was dramatically different for the buyins compared to the non-buy-ins even when standardized by age. The diagnosis group, "Endocrine, Nutritional, Metabolic Diseases" had a high ratio of 2.4. The leading diagnosis within that group "Diabetes Mellitus" had the highest ratio (2.6) of any of the 29 leading diagnoses among Medicare beneficiaries. The groups "Mental Disorders" and "Diseases of the Skin and Subcutaneous Tissues" each had high ratios of 2.2. Further study is needed to determine why such great differences exist.
Mortality rates
Differentials in the mortality rates by age, sex, and race between the buy-in and non-buy-in enrollees are shown in Table 13 . The death rate (standardized) for the buy-ins was 1.5 times that for non-buy-ins. A previous study that analyzed use and costs of health care services of Medicare beneficiaries in the last year of life (Lubitz and Prihoda, 1982) showed that in 1978, use of Medicare benefits by persons who died during that year greaty exceeded that of survivors. In that study, reimbursements per enrollee for persons in the last year of life were 6.2 times that for survivors. Thus, the higher utilization rates for the buy-ins very likely reflect, in part, their excess mortality.
The greatest differential in mortality rates for the two groups were found in the youngest age group. In the 65-69 age group the death rate for the buy-ins was 1.8 times the rate for non-buy-ins; for the 85 years and over group, the rate for the buy-ins was 1.3 times that for the comparison group. This question arises: Does the excess mortality found in the buy-in population primarily reflect a higher mortality experienced by the medically needy population-who enter the program because of illness and high medical bills? Or do the poor generally have higher mortality rates than the non-poor? To shed some light on this question, the buy-in groups were examined in each State. States were separated into two groups according to their coverage policy. It was determined that 21 States bought coverage for their cash assistance recipients only, and 25 States bought coverage for both their cash and noncash recipients (Table 14) .
This separation indicates that the excess mortality was greatest where the buy-in group included both cash and non-cash recipients, averaging 70 percent, whereas for the buy-in group which was confined to cash assistance recipients only, the excess mortality was 20 percent, after standardization by age.
For each of the groups, cash assistance recipients only and cash and non-cash recipients, there was a wide variation in mortality rates and in the ratios by State (Table 14) . Further study of Medicaid program characteristics is necessary for understanding and interpreting these differences. Table 15 shows mortality differences by demographic characteristics for the States that buy in for cash assistance recipients only and for States that buy in for both. It is interesting to note that for the cash assistance only group, there was no difference in the mortality rates for the two oldest age groups (80-84 and 85 years and over). Thus, the 20 percent excess mortality for the buy-ins for this group was directly attributable to the youngest age groups. For persons 65-69 years of age, the difference in mortality was 50 percent; for persons 70-79 the difference was 30 percent. Thus these figures indicate that the aged poor under 80 years of age apparently experience higher mortality rates than the non-poor. 
The Interrelationship between Medicare and Medicaid
Only utilization and expenditures under the Medicare program have been presented in this study. However, for both the buy-in group and the group without buy-in status there are substantial additional expenditures made for health care services. Many of those persons without buy-in status supplement their Medicare coverage by purchasing private health insurance. In addition, these individuals have out-of-pocket expenses. For buy-ins, Medicaid picks up a substantial portion of the health care expenses, including coinsurance and deductible amounts for services covered by Medicare, as well as for services not covered under Medicare but covered under Medicaid.
Since Medicare is the first payer for Medicarecovered services for the buy-ins, any benefit change in Medicare has a direct effect on Medicaid. If hospital services were restricted under Medicare or if cost-sharing were increased, the cost for these services to the dually entitled (shown in this study to be considerably higher than that for persons entitled to Medicare only) would be shifted directly to the Medicaid program. On the other hand, if program benefrts were restricted under the Medicaid program, this change could have an indirect impact on the Medicare program. For example, if the long-term care facility benefits were reduced under Medicaid, then the Medicare program might experience more acute care hospitalization.
The data presented in Table 16 on personal health expenditures demonstrate the interrelationship between Medicare and Medicaid. In 1978, personal health expenditures for the aged totaled $49.4 billion (or $2,026 per capita). Medicare and Medicaid, both publicly-funded programs, cover a substantial percentage of this total, with Medicare covering 44 percent and Medicaid an additional 13 percent.
It is important to observe how these programs complement and supplement each other. Medicare plays the most important role in financing hospital care and physicians' services, and Medicaid is most important with respect to nursing home care and other health care services, especially drugs. Medicare paid 75 percent of the expenditures for hospital care and Medicaid paid only 4 percent. On the other hand, Medicare paid only 3 percent of the nursing home care expenditures, compared to Medicaid's 39 percent.
Per capita payments under Medicare and Medicaid by State are shown in Table 17 . Nationally, per capita reimbursements under Medicare for the buy-in group averaged $1,283. Estimated per recipient payments under Medicaid averaged $1,908, yielding an approximate total per capita payment for the buy-in group under both programs of $3,191. 5 Because per capita personal health care expenditures for all aged persons in 1978 were estimated at about $2,000, and because the buy-in group has an estimated per capita expenditure of $3,191 , one can estimate that the per capita expenditure (public and private) for the Medicare group without buy-in status was $1,900, or about 60 percent of that for the buy-in group. 5 Per capita payments are overestimated to some extent because Medicaid payments are per recipient and include persons who are eligible for Medicaid only. 
Summary and Discussion
This study shows that the crossover population (identified by the "buy-in" indicator) differed substantially by demographic characteristics, compared to those without buy-in status. The buy-in group was considerably older, with 36 percent of the group 80 years of age and over compared to only 20 percent among those without buy-in status. Seventy-five percent of the buy-ins were white persons. Persons of races other than white comprised 24 percent of the buy-in group, but only 6 percent of those without buyin status. Furthermore, of all minority persons age 85 and over in the study, more than half (51 percent) were buy-ins. More than 70 percent of all buy-ins were women. Thus, the buy-in group may be characterized as being relatively older than other Medicare enrollees, largely composed of white persons and women, and with a higher proportion of minority persons than found in the general population.
This study showed that the proportion of users of Medicare services was much higher among the buyins than in the group with Medicare entitlement only. However, the average intensity of use of Medicare program dollars was relatively similar for the actual users of services among the buy-ins in comparison to other Medicare enrollees. These results, combined, produce far greater average reimbursements per enrollee among the buy-in group, though standardized for age differences.
The study also indicates that there were certain conditions among the leading diagnoses where there was little difference in the rate of hospitalization between the buy-ins and all others, particularly for malignant neoplasms and cataract. On the other hand, the rate of hospitalization was vastly greater for the buy-in group for certain other conditions, including diabetes.
This study attempted to answer the question: Do the high mortality rates found in the buy-in population reflect an underlying excess mortality of the poor (cash assistance recipients) or do they primarily reflect an expected high mortality of the medically needy group (persons with large medical bills)? We found that the cash assistance only group had an excess mortality of 20 percent whereas the group with both cash and non-cash recipients had an excess mortality of 70 percent. It was also noted that the 20 percent excess mortality found in the cash assistance group was attributable to persons under age 80 years of age. For those in the age group 65-69, the excess mortality was 50 percent and for those 70-79 the excess mortality was 30 percent, thus suggesting that the aged poor experience notably higher mortality rates than the non-poor.
The finding in this study that the buy-in group used considerably more services than the non-buy-in group raises the question: Why do some States decide not to enter into a buy-in agreement for any of their Medicaid eligibles and why do other States limit their buyin agreements to the cash assistance recipients only? One reason States may not buy coverage for their medically needy is that they are aware of the fact that many of the dually entitled population pay for their Part B coverage themselves. In addition, States do not receive Federal matching funds for Part B premiums for other than their cash assistance recipients.
Another explanation for the States' decisions is that there has been little information on the cost of providing Medicare services to Medicaid's aged population. In 1978, the States paid $95.40 per enrollee in premiums for Part B coverage, and the average reimbursement under Medicare Part B was $369 (Table 11) . Even though there are additional amounts such as deductibles and coinsurance that the States must pay for their crossover populations, it appears that it is advantageous for the States to buy coverage for this group. The findings from this study may be useful for some States as they consider their response to the recent legislation of December 1980 (Public Law 96-499), which allowed States to request buy-in agreements in 1981 (or send in a letter of intent), or to broaden their buy-in agreements. Under Public Law 96-499, Alaska entered into an agreement to buy coverage for both cash and non-cash Medicaid eligibles effective October 1982, and Michigan and Wisconsin broadened their agreements to cover the noncash group. Several other States, including two of the States without buy-in agreements (Oregon and Louisiana), recently submitted "letters of intent" to enter into buy-in agreements or to modify their agreements under this law.
Medicare and Medicaid are programs designed to remove financial barriers and equalize access to health care for the aged, disabled, and poor. There is evidence that access to care has been equalized to a large extent. However, differences between the poor and non-poor in health status evidently still persist. These differences are demonstrated by the high mortality rates of the buy-in group. These findings are substantiated by a recent study in which the poordespite Medicare and Medicaid-continue to report considerably more bed disability days and restricted activity days. Using data from the 1977 Health Interview Survey of the National Center for Health Statistics, the study shows a greater prevalence and severity of activity-limiting chronic conditions among lowincome people (Newacheck et al.) . The National Medical Care Utilization and Expenditures Survey (NMCUES) of 1980 also found higher restricted activity days among the low income population. Perhaps the excess morbidity and mortality of the poor as they enter their senior years, reflect a lifetime of poor nutrition, housing, and other non-medical factors that are believed to influence health status.
In order to look at total utilization and expenditures for the two populations reported upon in this study, we plan a second study using data from the NMCUES. This data source will provide for a more indepth analysis of public and private expenditures for health care. The survey data will also provide information on health status and income and will shed more light on the excess mortality and utilization patterns found in the current study for the buy-in group. To continue the analysis of the crossover population, a third study is planned using person-level data from the Medicaid Management Information System (MMIS).
Technical Note
Reliability of Estimates* Most of the utilization data shown in this paper are estimates from the 5-percent Continuous Medicare History sample and hence are subject to sampling error. Tables A, B , and C will enable the reader to obtain approximate standard errors for the estimates in this paper. The standard error is primarily a measure of sampling variability-that is, of the variation that occurs by chance because a sample rather than the whole population is used. To calculate the standard errors at a reasonable cost for the wide variety of estimates in this paper, it was necessary to use approximation methods. Thus, these tables should be used only as indicators of the order of magnitude of the standard errors for specific estimates.
The relative standard error is defined as the standard error of the estimate divided by the value being estimated. In general, estimates for small subgroups, and percentages or means with small bases tend to be relatively unreliable. The reader should be aware that some of the estimates in this paper have high relative standard errors.
The use of Table A is straightforward. For example, the standard error of an estimated 50,000 persons is found to be 970 persons. Simple linear interpolation may be used for values not tabled. Table A may also be used to find standard errors of rates of persons per 1,000 enrol lees or percent of persons. This is achieved by finding the standard error of the number of persons in the numerator of the rate or percent and dividing this by the enrollees or persons in the denominator of the rate or percent. Obtaining standard errors of estimated means from Table B , or estimated discharge rates from Table C requires knowledge of the number in the base of the estimate. To illustrate their use, Table 9 shows an average reimbursement of $549 for all persons age 70 to 74. The following steps, using double linear interpolation, show how to obtain the standard error of this estimate. 
